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by 
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The author is Research Fellow, the Centre for Bioethics and Public Policy, London 
Not content to be created in the image of God, man bas always wanted to be 
His equal. Recognizing that he has a free will, man has always known that he has 
special powers, powers such as no other mortal creatures have. But just as the 
Greek drama portrays the pitfalls of man's hubris, so too does the Bible tell us that 
we must beware of usurping the prerogative of God and must stop before the tree 
ofthe knowledge of good and evil. That is to say, we must recognize that it is not 
for us human beings to play God, seeking to steal divine powers or deciding for 
ourselves what is good and evil, right and wrong. 
Yet today with the advances in gene-technology, we may seem close to the 
realization of our ambition to become not the keepers of the universe but its 
supreme masters. Indeed, we are close to unveiling the highest secrets of alchemy, 
which is not a recipe for making gold but one for making designer-made children. 
Together, our new reproductive and genetic techniques go a long way towards 
satisfying the ambitions of the 14th century experimenter, astrologer and 
magician Johannes Faustus, whose greatest ambition it was to create a 
homunculus - a man-made man - the crown of alchemist creation. A thought 
as worrying as fascinating! Worrying because it would mean producing humans 
as artefacts. Fascinating, because it would mean power, an unknown and 
marvelous power with possibilities we cannot even fathom. 
For those who believe in God there can be no doubt that God's laws are there 
for us to follow and that some things really are wrong and that there is such a 
thing as objective moral truth. Limited as we are, thanks to our rational and 
God-like nature, we are, if we try, capable of recognizing what is right and wrong. 
We are indeed graced with special gifts and so are much more clever than any of 
the animals. But with our abilities come responsibilities, responsibilities for this 
world and all its creatures including ourselves. Today this responsibility is indeed 
widely recognized, even among people who do not believe in God or see our 
responsibility as delegated by God. Ecology is a big issue and rightly so. Today, 
with our new advances in science, it is more important than ever to take our 
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responsibility as the stewards of this world seriously and consider where this 
responsibility begins and where it ends. This is particularly true in the area of 
medicine, where, as our knowledge and our technical abilities increase, it 
becomes more and more difficult to decide how rightly to utilize our new-found 
powers. 
Since the subject matter of this paper is genetic engineering and the rightful 
limits of the new gene techniques, the question to be considered is what we as the 
keepers, not the supreme masters, ofthe earth mayor may not justifiably do in 
this new area of medicine. 
At present, scientists all over the world are trying to map the human genome, 
that is to say, map the building stones of the genetic blueprint for the species of 
man. It is probable that within ten years molecular biologists may have broken 
our entire genetic code. Already we know how to detect many hereditary 
diseases by means of our new technologies. At present, since there are few cures 
for these illnesses, this knowledge is used mainly in prenatal testing with a view to 
aborting children suffering from grave disease. Nevertheless, the hope is that one 
day this new science will enable us to find cures for hitherto incurable diseases, 
which would be wonderful, provided the new therapies have no undesirable 
physical side-effects or unfortunate moral implications. 
Genes 
What, then, is happening in this new area of medicine? In order to answer this 
question it may be helpful briefly to remind the reader how genes work. 
The human genome consists of some 50,000 to 100,000 genes. These are 
located on 23 pairs of chromosomes, themselves consisting of long molecules, 
so-called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) molecules, which means that, physically, 
genes are segments of DNA. Their function is to provide instructions for the 
production of different proteins and for controlling when and how much of a 
protein is made in what cell-type or tissue. A change in a gene, a mutation, brings 
about a change in the manufacture of the corresponding protein. This may cause 
a problem, that is, a genetic illness. As genes come in pairs (because 
chromosomes come in pairs) and, provided one of them is normal, the resulting 
function of the pair is usually normal. But sometimes a dominant gene takes 
control, resulting in the production of a harmful product. Huntington's chorea is 
such a dominant condition. In the case of recessive conditions, on the other hand, 
both of the genes in the' pair are faulty, their combined malfunctioning resulting in 
a failure to produce a certain protein. The thalasemias, sickle-cell disease and 
cystic fibrosis are recessive conditions. 
Genetic conditions inherited on the X-chromosomes are also recessive. This is 
why males, who inherit only one X-chromosome (from the mother - their other 
sex-chromosome being a Y -chromosome, inherited from the father), need just 
one bad gene to be affected, while females who have two X-chromosomes (one 
from the mother, the other from the father) rarely are affected. Duchenne 
muscular dystrophy, haemophilia and color blindness are X-linked conditions. 
Other genetic conditions, multifactorial conditions, are caused by the 
combined function of a number of genes together with environmental conditions. 
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Heart disease and cancer are of this type. 
With the help of our newfound DNA techniques it is now possible to detect 
a rapidly growing list of genetic conditions. We are also on the verge of finding 
gene therapies for some of these conditions. 
Testing 
To start with testing, we may distinguish between three kinds: prenatal 
diagnosis, carrier testing and predictive testing. 
Predictive testing 
We may speak of predictive testing when children or young adults are tested 
with a view to predicting the likelihood of their developing a certain disease in 
the future. The kind of conditions that will be candidates here are 
multifactorial conditions such as heart disease and late onset single-gene 
conditions, such as Huntington chorea, for the last-mentioned tests are already 
available. It is noteworthy, however, that in the case of many conditions, 
especially multifactorial ones, it will be hard to know exactly to what extent 
the individual will be affected. 
It goes without saying that this sort of testing could pose all sorts of 
problems. If a child is tested for a dominant condition such as Huntington's 
chorea and is found to have the gene, it means that one of its parents also has 
the gene and will fall ill in the future, ifhe or she has not already done so. It also 
means that any sister or brother of that child, as well as any sister or brother of 
the affected parent, has a 50% chance of having inherited the bad gene. Such 
information is not always welcome. Relatives of affected individuals may not 
necessarily wish to know that they, their children and parents, may be at risk. 
Conversely, an affected individual may not wish inform relatives of his 
problem, although they might have found such information helpful in planning 
their lives. There are problems about confidentiality here; and there are 
problems about relatives' rights to know and not to know. There is also the 
problem of giving consent to such testing in the case of children; and linked to 
this there is the problem of whether or when the child should be informed 
about test results. At a certain age the child may have a right to know, but 
would it really like to know? Moreover, if employers or insurance companies 
providing health care cover or life-insurance were to demand such testing, 
discrimination would be inevitable. And in many cases, this discrimination 
would be based on tests of poor predictive value in regard to exact prognosis. 
These are important issues with important implications for personal rights 
and personal integrity, but they do not essentially entail new and different 
attitudes to life and death, to our children or to procreation. It is not, then, in 
this area of screening that the changing frontiers of medicine threaten to alter 
our perception of ourselves and our children as truly human and possessing a 
special dignity. However, the other types of screening, carrier screening and 
prenatal screening, cannot but have long-term social consequences involving 
our attitudes towards our children and our understanding of ourselves as 
human. 
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Carrier testing 
Starting with carrier testing, it does have implications bearing on the 
understanding of human life and our place in the world. The main difference 
between predictive testing and carrier testing is to be found in the purpose of the 
tests. While predictive testing is performed primarily with a view to predicting 
the future health of the tested indi vidual, carrier testing is performed with a view 
to finding out whether the individual risks passing on a hereditary condition to his 
or her children. This sort of testing, then, which might be used in the case of 
certain chromosomal, as well some recessive and dominant single gene 
conditions, is performed in order to help couples to make so-called informed 
reproductive choices. It is mostly applicable to recessive conditions, such as the 
thalassaemias. 
In Cyprus, where people are particularly prone to thalasseamia, it is the 
practice to test all young people to see whether they are carriers of this disease. If a 
man and a woman wish to marry they have to produce a certificate showing that 
they have been tested. This is to make sure they know whether or not they are 
carriers. If both ofthem are carriers, any child they conceive has a 25% chance of 
inheriting a bad gene from each of them and being affected. Should the woman 
become pregnant, she will be offered prenatal diagnosis to enable the couple to 
"avoid the birth of a handicapped child". 
This shows that carrier testing is not a mere means of obtaining information, 
but is potentially a tool for implementing certain measures of population control. 
It could be used, then, to implement certain restrictions on people's right to 
marry. Such restrictions, which would concern marriages between two people 
who together risk passing serious genetic disease, would constitute a serious 
infringement of what is in our society a generally recognized right, namely the 
individual's right to marry and found a family with a partner of his or her choice. 
Carrier testing could also be used as a preamble to prenatal diagnosis, as is the 
case in Cyprus. It is claimed that recourse to prenatal diagnosis in Cyprus is 
absolutely voluntary. But one cannot but wonder wqyther the establishment's 
vigorous encouragement of the testing program does not constitute a certain 
pressure on the individual couple to abort "affected offspring". Such a pressure 
would encourage the view that children are disposable and replaceable - a view 
which is totally incompatible with the understanding of children, born and 
unborn, as members of the human family, possessing the same human dignity as 
the rest of us, and so the same fundamental human rights, the most basic one of 
which is the right to life. 
Prenatal diagnosis 
Prenatal testing has been around for several decades. But with improved 
ultrasound screening and the development of the new DNA techniques since the 
1980s, the number of detectable fetal conditions have been rapidly increasing. 
As to the moral issues, if the purpose of tests is to determine the health of the 
unborn child in order to guide the management of pregnancy towards a safe 
delivery, there is no problem. But most prenatal testing is undertaken for eugenic 
purposes, that is to say, in order to avoid the birth of a handicapped child. It is 
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widely assumed that it is better for its parents, for society - and even for the child 
itself - that is not born, if affected by a grave structural defect such as spina bifida 
or by a chromosomal condition such as Down or a genetic illness such as 
thalaseamia, Duchenne's muscular dystrophy or cystic fibrosis. 
The Catholic Church has, however, always considered abortion a grave sin. 
This was so in the early Church and remained true even in the Middle Ages and 
early modem times when many tli'eologians believed in delayed animation and, 
therefore, would not describe early abortion as homicide. As to abortion of a 
fetus thought to be ensouled, this has always been regarded as homicide by the 
Church. But even the abortion of a fetus not thought to be ensouled was always 
considered gravely wrong, because it meant interfering with the beginnings of 
human life and thwarting divine designs. 
Today, in the light of modem embryology, which testifies to the fact that 
human life is a continuous process initiated at conception, it is difficult to deny 
that the life of each one of us begins at conception and that from then onwards 
there is a human person, who remains the same individual human person 
throughout his existence. For if the organic process is a continuous one, as it 
clearly is, then it is hard to see how the developing entity could somehow, at a 
certain point in time, change nature from a mere potential human being or person 
to a real human being or person. In am a human person now, then I must surely 
have been a human person since the time my bodily life began at fertilization, 
when a new entity came to be, an entity with powers and potentials quite 
different from that of the sperm or ovum taken separately, an entity not only of 
human origin and alive but intrinsically capable of developing into what I am 
now. 
It is true that the Magisterium has not yet affirmed immediate animation or 
said explicity when the embryo or fetus becomes ensouled. But, to quote from the 
1987 document, Donum Vitae, even if "no experimental datum can be in itself 
sufficient to bring us to the recognition of a spiritual soul; nevertheless, the 
conclusions of science regarding the human embryo provides a valuable 
indication for discerning by the use of reason a personal presence at the moment 
of this first appearance of human life: how could a human individual not be a 
person" (Donum Vitae, I.. 1)7 The Church, then, while not actually affirming 
immediate animation, is now certainly hinting at it. 
The one situation in which it may be difficult to see how human personal life 
could begin at conception is when the product of conception develops into two 
identical twins. However, it should be pointed out that this type of twinning is 
very rare and the same in all human population, namely a mere 0.3% of all live 
births. It is therefore peculiar to a very small percentage of embryos, and so, 
.contrary to what has been suggested by many, mon~zygotic twinning provides 
no objection to regarding the vast majority of embryos as individual human 
beings from the time of conception. Moreover, the fact that the frequency is the 
same in all population groups and does not vary from one year to another 
indicates that it is genetically determined. This means that if the embryo twins, 
this is because it contains a gene programming that there should be not one but 
two individuals, and so in a sense there are already two individual presences in 
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such an embryo. If this sounds strange, consider the case of Siamese twins. Their 
situation is similar. 
But, for the sake of argument, assume that the twinning is not genetically 
determined and that the embryo that will twin is truly one individual. Surely, it is 
still human and alive, and so deserving of the same respect as other embryos? As 
for the question of what happens when it splits, if the zygote is just one individual, 
we might understand the twinning process as a form of asexual reproduction on a 
par with budding, in which case one twin is an off-shoot of the other. This would 
mean that one twin began life at conception, while the life of the other began at 
the time of separation. Surely, even in this situation each twin deserves to be 
respected from the time its life begins. 
In short, even in the case of twinning we would have to admit that from the 
time of conception there is an entity quite different from a sperm or an ovum. 
Provided this entity is not accidentally or intentionally destroyed it will develop 
into a mature person - or to two or more mature persons. It, therefore, deserves 
to be respected and protected as a person, and so abortion at any stage must be 
regarded as seriously wrong. 
No arguments for abortion 
However, we live in a society where the prevailing ethos is of a utilitarian cast 
and where the notion of sanctity oflife has lost its meaning, largely because many 
people no longer take religion seriously. Not surprisingly, then, most people see 
nothing wrong in abortion, at least not if it is done for the sake of the mother's 
well-being or for the sake of society or out of pity for the child itself in view of, 
say, its foreseeably poor "quality oflife". Let us briefly consider these arguments. 
To start with the argument based on the assumption that some lives are of such 
poor quality that they are not worth living, this is indeed a curious one. Yet, often 
it is the prospective parents themselves who voice such thoughts, saying that if the 
child were to suffer from a grave handicap, it would be better for it not to be born. 
But how can anyone presume to say that it would be better for another person not 
to be born, especially when there is no way of consulting that person about his or 
her feelings about the matter. In addition, a person born with certain handicaps is 
bound to have very different expectations from someone who is born healthy. 
And more importantly, since life is a precondition of ever experiencing or 
achieving anything at all in this world, to take the life of a fetus is to deprive it of 
any possibility of ever experiencing any human affection or any other form of 
communication with others. 
As to the argument that a handicapped child is a burden on its family, it may 
well be that a child born with a grave congenital defect would be a burden on its 
parents. And, it is always regrettable when a child is born with a serious illness or 
deformity. But it is also true that such children can give a lot of pleasure, as well as 
sorrow, and may enjoy life in their own way. Moreover, it is a fact that 
psychiatrists and councellors are becoming increasingly aware that abortions 
may have adverse psychological consequences - not least abortions on grounds of 
abnormality. The mother who undergoes prenatal tests to see whether her baby is 
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well normally wants to have her baby. For her to be faced with bad test results 
and confronted with the question of abortion is tragic. The natural response to a 
termination for abnormality is grief. Sometimes the mother manages to suppress 
her feelings. Sometimes her grief only surfaces many years later - triggered, 
perhaps, by the birth or death of another child or some other event involving 
children. But never does the mother feel no regrets at all. 
Regarding the argument that the child would be a burden on society, there is 
no doubt that large-scale national screening programmes, set up in order to 
reduce the number of births of disabled children, are to a significant extent 
influenced by purely financial considerations. Such children may need special 
medical care and special schooling. This costs money. But the value of human life 
is not pecuniary, it is of a different order altogether. 
Of course, apart from this consumerist and utilitarian attitude to human life, 
another influence at work shaping current screening programmes, and social 
attitudes to the same, relate to ideologies about breeding certain types of humans 
and avoiding the births of others. This sort of thinking is no novelty, but was 
to be found already in Plato's Republic. But the origins of current reasoning 
concerning prenatal screening - as well as some of the aspirations in connection 
with gene-therapy - lie closer in time and are to be found in 19th century and 
early 20th century thought, with the two most notable influences having been 
Malthus's population theory and Galton's theory of eugenics. While Malthus's 
theory has encouraged what might be called negative eugenics aimed at avoiding 
socially undesirable births, that of Galton has amounted to a call for positive 
eugenics in the form of selective breeding or the achievement of systematic 
genetic changes in individuals or their offspring with a view to promoting certain 
types of human. 
Now, many advocates of selective abortion would argue that prenatal eugenics 
will in no way influence attitudes towards more mature disabled people. But they 
delude themselves. The underlying rationale of prenatal screening is that the 
disabled are a nuisance, and so the practice is bound in the long run to undermine 
the position of the disabled and promote a less tolerant society - one where 
people may even be punished, financially or otherwise, for bringing imperfect 
children into this world and where the survi val of the fi ttest is the order of the day. 
Prenatal diagnosis is bound in the long run to have serious effects leading to a 
much less tolerant society generally, one in which none of us may feel secure if 
diasabled, old or infirm. 
Finally, it is, of course, also true that prenatal diagnosis with a view to selective 
abortion is contrary not only to Christian thinking but the antique Hippocratic 
tradition of medicine adopted by Christian physicians from the earliest times. 
Since, the traditional Hippocratic aim of medicine has been to heal, and, if that is 
not possible, to provide palliation, one of the main principles of Hippocratic 
medicine has been to avoid causing harm. Diagnostic procedures in keeping with 
this aim of medicine would promote the health and well-being of the patient 
whose health is being examined. But if prenatal diagnosis with a view to selective 
abortion is part of medical care, it is an exception to this rule. It is not aimed at 
promoting the health of the unborn child but at getting rid of it, should it be 
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suffering from some undesirable condition. Of course, prenatal diagnosis also 
involves pregnant women. But they are not the focus of the investigation. There 
are. two patients here, and if the standard rule of medicine were followed, the 
malO purpose would be to promote the health of the one who is being examined. 
Hence, even if selective abortion is beneficial for women, which is doubtful, 
current screening practice is beyond the pale of traditional medicine. 
Gene-therapy and Single-gene Defects 
The question now to consider is whether some forms of gene-therapy are not 
also beyond that pale. We talk of two types of gene-therapy: somatic and 
germ-line. While somatic cell gene-therapy involves the correction of genes 
within somatic cells, that is cells other than ova, sperm cells and their precursors, 
germ-line cell therapy involves precisely the cells of the germ-line, i.e. ova, sperm 
cells and their precursors as well as the cells of the early embryo not yet 
differentiated into germ-line cells as distinct from other cells. Whereas the former 
type of therapy affects only the individual patient treated, the latter kind of 
therapy affects future generations. 
Somatic gene-therapy 
Somatic gene therapy with a view to curing or alleviating a single-gene 
condition of a particular individual is already a reality, but only in the case of 
recessive as opposed to dominant conditions. This is because recessive conditions 
are the result of two non-functioning genes; and the kind of gene-therapy 
presently being developed involves the insertion of missing healthy genes into 
appropriate cells, there to stimulate the production of a missing protein, and so 
cure the patient. A cure for a dominant condition, on the other hand, would 
req uire the elimination ofthe dominant disease-causing gene in a gene-pair. This 
is not yet technically feasible, but no doubt one day it will be. 
The first successful attempt at gene-therapy was performed on a four-year-old 
girl in September 1990 (at the National Institute of Bethesda) in Maryland. The 
girl suffering from ADA deficiency (adenosine deaminase deficiency), a rare and 
until now incurable recessive immune defiency. At present, gene-therapy trials 
are under way with cystic fibrosis patients. And it may also be noted that the new 
gene-techniques have wider therapeutic possibilities than the correction of single-
gene disorders and may soon be used to treat several forms of cancer. 
Moral issues 
As to the ethics of somatic gene-therapy, it should be noted that it is no different, 
in principle, from conventional types of medical treatment; it is but another, if 
novel, way of seeking to cure individual patients. It does not raise any novel 
moral issues, but here as in more conventional types oftherapy, what is at issue is 
the risk to the individual patient. But the risks are considerable; we do not yet 
know the long-term consequences of this use of viruses or other mechanisms to 
ferry genes into different tissues. We cannot exclude the possibility that patients 
treated by such means later on in life may develop cancers or immune system 
problems. Yet, provided we procede with the utmost caution, the developments 
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in somatic gene therapy do offer new hope to people affected by fatal or seriously 
debilitating diseases for which there are no other cures. 
Germline gene-therapy 
Germ-line cell therapy, on the other hand, is fundamentally different from 
conventional treatment. It is intended to cure not only the individual patient but 
future generations. This means the risks involved concern not only the individual 
treated but also his offspring. Here we really do have to consider the question of 
where to draw the line between interference that is, and interference that is not, in 
keeping with our duties as responsible and respectful keepers of the earth and all 
its creatures, including ourselves. 
Here, then, there is a lot more at stake than solely medical risks - and these are 
serious enough. To start with the risks, the price to be paid for any mishaps would 
be high, since these would be hereditary and transmitted from one generation to 
the next. Furthermore, germ-line therapy means treating or subjecting future 
generations to today's techniques, techniques which may seem crude and simple 
by tomorrow's standards. Of course, it is hoped that if germ-line therapy is 
achieved, it might rid mankind of some diseases altogether, or at least rid many 
families of certain diseases. However, there would always be new mutations, and 
some of the old diseases would turn up de novo in new generations. In addition, 
some of the disease genes got rid of might carry information for other traits than 
the disease we wish to eliminate; some good traits might be lost in the process. 
And by depleting our common gene-pool, we might genetically impoverish 
future generations. Because of these medical risks, then, there is at present a 
world-wide moratorium on this kind of therapy. 
Apart from the risks just mentioned there are certain other important moral 
considerations to bear in mind. Some of these concerns relate to the fact that 
most, if not all, germ-line therapy would involve extra-corporeal conception. The 
Catholic Church has always urged the utmost respect for human life from the 
time of conception. But extra-corporeal conception inevitably entails embryo 
selection and. hence, embryo-wastage. No embryo deemed unfit for life would 
ever be implanted, and if there were several to choose from, only the best (one, 
two or three) would be chosen. 
Moreover, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, in Donum Vitae of 
1987 (Instruction of Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of 
Procreation), has ruled out, even within marriage, all forms of reproduction not 
initiated by the bodily union of man and woman. This is on the ground that it is 
incompatible with the dignity both of the couple and of the child-to-be. 
Procreation by-passing the sexual union of man and woman denies the essence of 
their natures as male and female, complementary and created for each other and 
new life. Only the sexual embrace of mutual commitment and self-giving and of 
unconditional and faithful acceptance can be a truly worthy setting for the 
beginning of a new human life. This is the only setting fostering an attitude of full 
acceptance of the child and of true parental ge:lerosity and commitment. The 
child so conceived is begotten, not made, of one being with its parents. By 
contrast, when the child is procreated by means of IVF or similar techniques, the 
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process turns into a form of production with the result that the child comes mto 
being, not like a gift received, but like an artefact ordered to specification or 
bought in the medical super-market or consulting room. Ind~, the child which 
is made, not begotten, is the belated realization of the aspirations of Johannes 
Faustus, the 14th century magician and alchemist. 
Even if it were to become possible to perform germ-line therapy not involving 
extra-corporeal conception but, say, early treatment of normally conceived 
embryos in the womb or of germ-cells before natural fertilization, and even if the 
risks could be minimized and the technique were to enable us to cure some 
hitherto incurable diseases, allowing people who could not otherwise have 
healthy children to have them, it would still remain a moot point whether this 
type of therapy is morally permissible. Germ-line therapy means exercising a new 
form of control over future generations. Even if our intentions were the best, what 
right would we have to do so? 
One important question is whether the individual has a right to an unchanged 
genetic heritage? Could we envisage a genetic change that would eliminate a 
serious disease such as cystic fibrosis or Huntinton's chorea within a certain 
family? And could we justify genetic alterations affecting the personality of future 
individuals? Then there is the question of consent. Would it be right for parents to 
give consent to alterations affecting not only their own child but their 
grandchildren and their great-grandchildren? 
The main question at issue is really whether using germ-line therapy means 
making "designer babies", and therefore threatens to foster a producer & 
consumer attitude towards children. When people start asking for babies with 
-or without - certain qualities, there is the risk, the social and moral risk, that 
the value of children will be measured in units of health and performance quality, 
social utility and parental satisfaction. That is to say, there is the risk that their 
intrinsic value and dignity as human beings, as our neighboUrs and fellow images 
of God will tend to be forgotten. 
Enhancement Genetic Engineering 
The social and moral risks of designing babies becomes clearer in the context 
of so-called enhancement gene-therapy - techniques, intended not to cure 
people of illness, but to improve them in other ways by making them better 
looking, more artistic or more intelligent or athletic. 
Enhancement genetic engineering need not involve germ-line therapy but 
could conceivably be restricted to the individual child, that is to say, the 
individual infant or child in the womb. That would avoid the risks related to 
hereditary alterations as well as the moral issues related to extra-corporeal 
conception, but the designer aspect would remain. 
To focus then on the designer aspect, and more particularly on the idea of 
improvement, it is no novelty to use medical procedures for non-curative or 
cosmetic purposes. And it may be argued that, since parents normally have a right 
to make decisions concerning the health of their own children, it would be 
inconsistent to forbid them to choose enhancement genetic engineering for them. 
What could be wrong with improving one's childrens' athletic or mathematical 
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performance - or beauty? But the analogy between cosmetic surgery and 
enhancement genetic engineering should not lead one to conclude that because 
some forms of cosmetic surgery are justified some forms of enhancement genetic 
engineering would be. 
FIrst, we might distinguish between quite arbitrary non-perfective 
interventions, on the one hand, and perfective interventions on the other. Most 
people would probably reject the idea of arbitrary non-perfective interventions to 
satisfy the whim of the individual couple wanting a baby with certain 
characteristics, such as blue eyes and blond locks. However, some might argue 
that certain traits or characteristics are objectively better than others. The traits in 
question would probably be those relating to intellectual ability and physical 
performance. However, the suggestion that we might agree on which traits are 
objectively superior to others, is as naive as it is dangerous. It may indeed be true 
that some traits are objectively better, that is better before God, than others. But 
when people disagree about the ranking of different characteristic, who is to 
decide which ranking is the right one? Whose choia! is to prevail? 
Also, it should be noted that a person's personality depends on all his 
intellectual, emotive, affective and other mental and spiritual characteristics 
working together. Who are we to alter this inter-play? What could possibly make 
anyone think that it is for us to decide that it would be better for a child to be given 
a certain gene conferring on it, say, greater mathematical or musical ability? The 
hoped for mathematical or musical genius may tum out to be devoid of all feeling 
or to be a Frankenstein monster. If there is something particularly disturbing 
about the idea of seeking to determine or design the very personality of a 
child-to-be, is this because we intuit that we are over-stepping the limits of what 
we might rightfully do as keepers of this world, including ourselves and our 
children? 
It is one thing to encourage children to develop the. abilities or traits which they 
have inherited. It is quite a different thing for parents to, as it were, implant 
certain abilities of their choice in their children. And there are many reasons why 
children might resent parental actions of this radicaJ kind. 
First, there is the problem of how to be sure that one trait is objectively better 
than another. In particular, the present generation's perception of improvement 
may not be the same as that of future generations. Moreover, children who have 
been genetically tampered with for the sake of their improvement, may well 
resent having been treated as manufactures. As the Pope said in his 1983 address 
on genetic engineering to the World Medical Association. "genetic manipulation 
becomes arbitrary and unjust when it reduces life to an object, when it forgets it is 
dealing with human subjects, capable of intelligence and freedom, worthy of 
respect whatever may be their limitations." 
Of course, the advocates of enhancement gene treatment may argue that there 
is no sharp line between cure and enhancement - or that curing really is 
enhancing. And so, if curing is alright why enhancement, at least if it is restricted 
to the individual child and does not affect future generations. But this argument 
does not help their case. There is no clear line betwe,en talking or shouting either, 
yet there are definite cases of both. And most of us can see that there are such 
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things as real illnesses, and that curing the individual child of an illness such as 
cystic fibrosis is very different from making sure it has the body and strength of an 
Olympic athlete, the mathematical and scientific intelligence of an Einstein and 
the voice of a Pavarotti or Maria Callas. 
Indeed, is it not true that there is something very distressing about people's 
ambitions to enhance the qualities of their children? Implicit in this way of 
thinking is a refusal to accept children as they are. And, surely, our acceptance of 
our children should not be conditional on whether they fulfil certain standards or 
specifications. Yet, conditional acceptance of children has already become an 
everyday fact, as witness the practice of prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion 
of substandard babies. If prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion is one side of 
the eugenic coin, enhancement techniques promoting certain types of child 
regarded as superior is the other. The latter may be regarded as a more benevolent 
approach, but it confers a new dimension on human relationship by turning 
children into goods made to specification. To seek a cure for a sick child is a very 
different thing. This is to take care of it and accept it as is, while doing everything 
to help it. 
If we turn children into artifacts manufactured to our specification, we 
depersonalize them and by so doing we devalue our relationship with them. By 
viewing children as objects and seeing their value as a measure of the extent to 
which they meet our expectations, we degrade our children and impoverish 
ourselves. 
According to the Biblical tradition, human value and dgnity derives from the 
understanding that each one of us is created in the same image, the image of God. 
This view may no longer be generally accepted. However, each one of us 
recognizes his or her own worth as a person. To recognize another as a person is 
to recognize that same intrinsic human worth in him. But the techniques of 
prenatal selection and enhancement engineering are an offense to human dignity, 
because they mean treating children as commodities and objects of manipulation 
which must satisfy our requirements and pass our quality control. These 
techniques ignore the inherent dignity and worth of each one of us, whatever our 
limitations. They overstep the boundaries of what we might rightfully do as 
stewards, but not masters, of our own and our children's earthly natures. 
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